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Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Capital Structure in UAE 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: Our paper aims to contribute to prior research by examining the relation 
between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate capital structure in one of 
the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In particular, we examine 
the degree to which internal corporate governance mechanisms and an external 
corporate governance mechanism affect UAE firms’ financing decisions. 
Design/methodology/approach: We use a multiple regression analysis to examine 
the association between corporate governance and capital structure for a sample of 
71 UAE firms listed either in the Dubai financial market or the Abu Dhabi securities 
market during 2006.  
Findings:  We find that institutional investors have a negative impact on debt-to-
equity ratio. This result does not support the ‘active monitoring hypotheses where 
institutional investors are expected to exercise their voting rights effectively in order 
to prevent managers from reducing their ‘employment risk’ at the expense of the 
interests of shareholders. We find no significant association between our measures of 
the other corporate governance mechanisms and debt-to-equity ratio.  We also find 
that dividend policy is negatively associated with debt-to-equity ratio, while firms’ 
size is positively associated with debt-to-equity ratio.   
Research implications: Our study has policy implications for both the UAE stock 
market and for other emerging economies. 
Originality: To the best of our knowledge, there is no study has yet empirically 
examined the effect of the corporate governance mechanisms on capital structure in 
UAE or Middle Eastern countries. 
Keywords: corporate governance mechanisms, capital structure, dividend policy, 




Corporate capital structure decisions present a challenge for Accounting and 
Finance academic researchers. This area of research is well recognized in prior 
research related to the determinants of corporate capital structure choices. The pioneer 
paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958) is considered to be the first academic paper to 
examine this interesting research topic. Modigliani and Miller (1958) show the 
irrelevance of capital structure decisions for firm value in perfect capital markets. In 
1963, they also relax the prefect market assumptions and consider corporate tax in 
their models (Miller and Modigliani, 1963). Accordingly, they provide new evidence 
that the firm value will be enhanced if the level of debt increases. Their results 
suggest that interest is tax deductible, accordingly firms would benefit from debt tax 
shield when funding their activities by long-term debt. A natural response from 
academic researchers to these lines of research is to further investigate other drivers of 
corporate capital structure choices.  
Prior research examines the effect of corporate governance internal and 
external mechanisms on corporate capital structure decisions (see for example 
Crutchley et al., 1999; Gul, 1999; Wen et al., 2002; Du and Dia, 2005; La Rocca, 
2007; Driffield et al., 2007; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009a, 2009b). However, to the 
best of our knowledge, no study yet has examined the influence of corporate 
governance on capital structure decisions in United Arab of Emirate (UAE) or Middle 
Eastern countries. Although this study has specific relevance to the needs of the UAE 
business environment, it is believed that many other developing countries, especially 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Middle Eastern countries, share similar 
social, political and economic environments. The results of this study may be  
beneficial and applicable to these countries as well. In addition, the results of this 
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study may be of interest to policy makers and regulators in other countries with 
similar socio-economic environments. Consequently, this paper is the first to examine 
the potential corporate governance internal and external mechanisms that might drive 
UAE firms to use debt to finance their activities.   
The distinctive features of UAE make our study important. For example, 
Marly and Dillon (2007) argue that, “Western investors have turned to Dubai to 
establish their regional headquarters while young entrepreneurs are creating firms in 
this tiny emirate; yet, with Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman establishing similar incentives 
on paper, why is Dubai still the destination of choice? We argue it is due to three 
drivers: (1) speed, (2) culture and (3) Governance.” Therefore, we believe that 
studying and determining the association between corporate governance and capital 
structure is extremely important, especially after the current financial crises, to 
enhance the efficiency of the UAE market. The results of this study are likely to 
attract the attention of the UAE policy makers and regulators to some important issues 
related to corporate governance and capital structure. The UAE has recently initiated 
the application of international standards of corporate governance attempting to merge 
with the global economy. By examining the association between internal and external 
mechanisms of corporate governance and capital structure, the UAE authorities may 
direct their attention to develop a model of efficiency and a good practice of corporate 
governance. In addition, determining those factors that have significant effect on 
capital structure decisions will assist policy makers and regulators to identify 
situations where efforts should be made to have a healthy association between 
corporate governance and capital structure.  
We find that the capital structure decisions are effected by three variables (i.e., 
institutional investors, firm size, and dividend payout). The only corporate 
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governance variable that is found to have a significant relation with the debt-to-equity 
ratio is the institutional investors variable. This relation is found to be negative, 
implying that firms with a high proportion of shares held by institutional investors are 
less likely to use debt financing. This supports the pecking order theory where firms 
prefer an internal source of financing (e.g., cash flows from operating activities). The 
other corporate governance variables (board size, audit type, and governmental 
investors) and other capital structure theories (i.e., trade off theory, bankruptcy theory, 
agency theory, and transaction cost theory) are found to have no significant affect on 
capital structure decisions in the UAE. This is probably because of the different legal, 
institutional, and cultural factors that shape the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms. For example, there is no income tax in the UAE. Therefore, the trade off 
theory is not applicable. In addition, the corporate governance system is based on 
large shareholders, as in other developing countries, which makes the agency problem 
less severe and has only a weak affect on the capital structure decisions.  
This paper extends the literature by revealing the impact of selected corporate 
governance mechanisms (mainly institutional investors and governmental investors) 
that have not been examined in such an environment and have not been used 
extensively in other environments. Furthermore, this study enriches the literature by 
arguing that capital structure theories, in a developing country such as UAE, have 
limited effect on the capital structure decisions.  
The reminder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review 
relevant capital structure theories. Section 3 discusses previous studies on the drivers 
of corporate capital structure and develops the research hypotheses. Section 4 
describes our research method and data. Section 5 presents our empirical findings, and 
Section 6 concludes and suggests areas for future research. 
 6 
2. Capital structure theories 
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) capital structure irrelevance propositions, 
academic researchers have advanced a number of capital structure theories. These 
theories are extensive and can be classified into two groups: tax-based theories and 
non-tax based theories. Tax-based theories include both bankruptcy and trade-off 
theories; while non-tax based theories include agency, signalling, pecking order and 
transaction cost theories. As United Arab Emirates (UAE) is considered as one of the 
Arab economies that does not have taxes. We consider both bankruptcy and trade-off 
theories as irrelevant for the UAE business environment. Therefore, the present paper 
reviews relevant capital structure theories and attempts to relate the different theoretical 
attributes to the UAE business environment in order to formulate our research 
hypotheses. Next subsections will explain these theories.    
2.1. Agency theory 
The agency relation is defined as: “a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service 
on their behalf which involves delegating some decisions making authority to the 
agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976:308). Agency theory looks at the conflicts of 
interest arising from the possible divergence between the principal (shareholders) and 
agent (manager) of firms. It is argued that managers have incentives to make 
investment decisions that reduce their employment risk or increase their compensation 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981; Baker et al., 1988; Donaldson, 1984). Such agency problems 
lead to agency costs which are related to monitoring costs and other costs by the agent 
to assure shareholder that there will be no harm to their interest.  
 7 
Based on the agency theory, debt financing can be used as a useful governance 
device in reducing the conflict of interests between the agent and principal (Jensen, 
1986). In particular, debt can serve as a substitute mechanism to reduce the agency 
costs of free cash flow available to managers by making them disgorge it to investors 
(Jensen, 1986; Kochhar, 1996).   
2.2. Signalling theory  
Asymmetric information costs exist when only manager possess private 
information about firm’s return opportunities and at the same time shareholder do not 
have access to this information. Signalling theory suggests that the choice of the 
firm’s capital acts as a signal to outsider investors of the information held by 
shareholders (Michaelas et al, 1999). This indicates that outsiders will consider any 
meaningful change in capital structure as a signal for corporate potential performance. 
The theory assumes that firms should not send any false signals to the market, and 
consequently investors can differentiate among firms using such signals. The 
announcement of debt financing may be considered as a positive signal by 
shareholders. A debt issuance may signal that the firm has good financial prospects 
that managers do not want additional shareholders to share this potential profit (Ryen 
et al., 1997; Koch and Shenoy, 1999). In addition, the debt issuance may signal that 
the firm will be able to pay dividend for current shareholders (Chang and Rhee, 
1990).    
2.3. Pecking order theory  
The pecking order theory was developed in two pioneer academic papers 
(Myers, 1984 and Myers and Majluf, 1984). The theory assumes that firms generally 
prefer internal to external finance. The theory is based on two practical assumptions 
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(Myers, 2001).  First, there is an information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders. Second, firms would follow a pecking order in their financing, in which 
managers would prefer an internal source of financing (i.e. cash flows from corporate 
operations). If the cash flows from corporate operations are insufficient and external 
funds are required for capital investment, firms will issue the safest security first, this 
is, debt. Myers (1984) argues that firms would prefer debt financing rather than 
issuing equity because of lower information costs associated with debt financing. This 
leads to an increase in the debt-to-equity ratio.  If there is a requirement of further 
external financing, firms work down from safe to riskier debt, perhaps convertible 
securities or preferred stock are used first, and when it is not reasonable to use more 
debt then equity will be the last option.  
2.4. Transaction cost theory  
Transaction cost theory mainly was developed by Coase (1937). Kochhar 
(1996:715) explains that, “transaction cost economies is concerned with the 
governance of contractual relations in transactions between two parties (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1975, 1985)”. Each governance structure is associated with different 
levels of transaction costs. These include “costs arise from the setup and running costs 
of the governance structures, as well as other costs, such as those due to renegotiation, 
that arise from a shift in the alignment” (Kochhar, 1996:715). He argues that 
transactions costs and benefits associated with different sources of finance are not the 
same.  For example, although debt holders can push the firm into bankruptcy if the 
firm fails to meet its contractual obligations (i.e. repaying the principal and the 
interest), they have little control over managerial actions in ensuring that resources are 
efficiently used. On the other hand, the equity holders have control over managerial 
actions (i.e. they can monitor and evaluate managerial actions continuously). In 
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addition, equity possesses stronger governance abilities than the debt instrument 
(Kochhar, 1996) and then transactions costs for equity issuance is usually higher than 
transaction costs for debt issuance. Furthermore, it is well known that large firms tend 
to have more transactions in the stock market compared with small firms. Therefore 
this theory predicts that transaction costs of large firms are more likely to be lower 
than transaction costs for small firms. Hence, large (small) firms are expected to use 
more (less) equity financing than debt financing. 
 3. Related Literature and Research Hypotheses   
Related Literature  
In this paper, we evaluate whether a UAE firm's capital structure decisions are 
affected by internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. Prior research 
suggests firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms that potentially 
drive the capital structure decisions. In Section 2, we discussed the main theories of 
capital structure decisions. In this section, we review relevant empirical research that 
investigates the degree to which the above theories explain firm's capital structure 
decisions in the UAE.  
Prior research suggests several factors that affect firms’ decisions in choosing 
their capital structure. The work of Titman and Wessels (1988) is considered to be a 
landmark study of the determinants of capital structure. They find that firm's size and 
profitability are negatively associated with the debt-to-equity ratio, while firm's asset 
tangibility is positively associated with the debt-to-equity ratio. These findings are 
consistent with transaction cost theory, pecking order theory, and agency theory. 
Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (1995) investigate the determinants of capital structure 
in major industrialised countries. They find that the market-to-book ratio of assets and 
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profitability ratio are negatively associated with the debt-to-equity ratio, while asset 
tangibility and firm's size are positively related to the debt-to-equity ratio. These 
results are consistent with pecking order theory, bankruptcy theory, and agency 
theory. However, the negative relationship between the market-to-book ratio of assets 
and the debt-to-equity ratio is inconsistent with agency theory.  
In addition, in a seminal empirical study, Delcoure (2007) examines the 
determinants of capital structure choices in a sample of Central and Eastern European 
countries. The author finds that asset tangibility is positively associated with capital 
structure choices and this finding is consistent with agency theory. Consistent with the 
pecking order theory the study also shows a negative association between profitability 
and capital structure choice.  
The above empirical research shows that there are 'core' firm characteristics 
determinants of capital structure choices, however, these papers do not take into 
account corporate governance internal and external mechanisms.  
In prior research, there is strong evidence that internal and external 
mechanisms of corporate governance affect corporate capital structure decisions 
(Crutchley et al., 1999; Gul, 1999; Wen et al., 2002; Du and Dia, 2005; La Rocca, 
2007; Driffield et al., 2007; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009a, 2009b). Although the 
relation between corporate governance and capital structure has been the subject of 
extensive research in developed countries, limited research has been carried out to 
investigate the issue in business environment of developing countries and even fewer 
such studies may be found in the Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, we are aiming 
to answer the following research question: What drives the capital structure decisions 
of UAE listed firms? We are particularly interested to know whether corporate 
governance affects the capital structure choices for firms listed in Dubai financial 
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market or the Abu Dhabi securities market. In the subsequent paragraphs we discuss 
the formulation of our research hypotheses.  
Research Hypotheses   
Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Board Size: The board of directors is responsible for managing firm’s 
activities and making strategic decisions (i.e. the optimal capital structure mix). The 
relation between the number of directors on boards and corporate capital structure 
choices has been well established in prior accounting and finance research (see for 
example Mehran, 1992; Berger et al., 1997, Wiwattanakantang, 1999, Wen et al., 
2002, Du and Dia, 2005, Abor and Biekpe, 2005, and Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009a 
and 2009b. However, the empirical evidence on direction of the association between 
board size and capital structure is mixed.   
Mehran (1992), Berger et al. (1997), and Abor and Biekpe (2005) find that 
there is a significant negative association between board size and debt-to-equity ratio. 
This means that firms with larger board of directors generally have low debt-equity 
ratios.   Berger et al. (1997) argue that larger boards exert pressure on managers to 
follow lower debt-to-equity ratio and enhance firm performance.  
On the other hand, a positive and statistically significant relation is found in 
Jensen (1986). This positive sign indicates that firms with larger board size are more 
likely to use more debt to finance their activities than equity. Other researchers find 
no statistically significant relation between board size and debt-to-equity ratio 
(Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Wen et al., 2002; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009a). Wen et 
al. (2002) argue that firms with large boards are more likely to follow a policy of 
higher levels of debt-equity ratios to enhance firm value especially when these are 
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entrenched due to greater monitoring by regulatory authorities. They also argue that 
larger board may find it difficult to reach a consensus in decisions which can 
ultimately affect corporate governance quality of a particular firm (i.e. increasing 
agency costs). Hence, debt issuance is more likely to be used as a governance 
mechanism to reduce the conflict of interests between the agents and principals by 
reducing the agency costs of free cash flow available to managers (Jensen, 1986; 
Kochhar, 1996).   
In UAE, large firms are more likely to have large board size. Large firms with 
large board size are expected to be profitable and have less potential for bankruptcy 
compared with small firms. Because of UAE and culture-related issues, it is extremely 
difficult to reach a consensus in decisions especially in a UAE economic system and 
this might lead to increase agency costs and reduce firm performance (Aljifri and 
Moustafa, 2007). Additionally, Anderson et al. (2004) argue that the cost of debt is 
generally lower for firms with large number of directors on their board. Therefore, we 
expect that UAE firms with higher board size will use debt issuance rather than equity 
issuance to finance their activities. This should reduce agency costs for these firms.  
Thus our first hypothesis is:   
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relation between board size and the 
debt-to-equity ratio.  
Institutional Investors: The relation between institutional investors and 
corporate capital structure decisions has received little attention in prior research. 
Jensen (1986) argues that this type of investors can reduce the agency costs by 
monitoring the corporate performance and by ensuring the shareholders’ interests. In 
addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) offer evidence that these investors monitor 
management team's performance effectively.  
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Lev (1988) argues that the institutional investors are well informed compared 
with individual investors. This is due to the fact that institutional investors have easy 
access to different sources of information. As a result, Lakshmi (2009:2) argues that: 
 "The close monitoring of institutional investors may force managers to take 
decisions in the interests of shareholders. Their ability to purse self interests may 
diminish. As a result, managers may be prevented from employing lower levels of debt 
to protect their employment risk". 
 
Crutchley et al. (1999) provide evidence that the association between 
institutional investors and the debt-to-equity ratio is positive and statistically 
significant. This leads us to set the second research hypothesis for the impact of 
institutional investors on the capital structure choices as follows:  
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between institutional investors 
and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
Governmental Ownership: Prior research offers empirical evidence that the 
association between governmental ownership and debt financing is positive and 
statistically significant (Gul, 1999). Similar to the effect of institutional investors, we 
expect that government will force corporate managers to take decisions in the interests 
of shareholders. Consequently, corporate managers will potentially avoid choosing 
lower levels of debt to guard their employment risk. Based on the empirical evidence 
of Gul (1999), we expect a positive relationship between governmental ownership and 
the debt-to-equity ratio. Therefore, we set the third research hypothesis for the impact 
of governmental ownership on the capital structure choices as follows:  
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between governmental ownership 
and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
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An External Corporate Governance Mechanism 
A number of relatively new articles have investigated the association between 
asymmetric information and corporate financial decisions (see Li and Zhao, 2006 for 
more details). In a recent study, Bharath et al. (2009) use a new information 
asymmetry index and study the degree of information asymmetry is considered as one 
of the determinants of corporate capital structure decisions. They contributed to 
accounting and finance literature by offering the first evidence that asymmetric 
information drives the capital structure decisions of US firms. In particular, they find 
a positive relationship between their measure of asymmetric information and the debt-
to-equity ratio. In other words, their findings show that US firms with higher levels of 
information asymmetric are more likely to use debt in financing their activities than 
equity. Based on the above results, we investigate the role of the information 
environment on the capital structure decisions for a sample of UAE listed firms. We 
use audit type as a measure of the firm’s information environment. Prior research 
finds that audit type is negatively associated with asymmetric information. For 
example, Lee et al. (2007) and Hussainey (2009) offer evidence that when financial 
statements are  audited by big 4 firms, the levels of corporate information asymmetry 
between the firm and investors are reduced and hence investors can better anticipate 
future earnings in the stock market. Based on these arguments and empirical evidence, 
we set the following fourth research hypothesis for the impact of audit type (as a 
proxy for asymmetric information) on capital structure decisions:  




3. Research Method and Data 
Research Method  
With the aim of examining the association between corporate governance 
internal and external mechanisms and corporate capital structure decisions, we regress 
the debt-to-equity ratio on some corporate governance mechanisms and some control 
variables. We use the following model to test our research hypotheses: 
                     itLev =    +   itX + it              
Where: 
 itLev  is our measure of the capital structure decisions which is defined as debt 
to equity ratio;  is the intercept.   is the slope coefficient estimates of regressors. 
itX  is the corporate governance variables (i.e. board size, institutional investors, 
governmental ownership and audit type) and for firm i at time t. Our dependent and 
independent variables are defined in Table (1). 
 We also include four control variables in our regression model. These include Tobin's 
Q, profitability, firm size and dividend policy. Tobin's Q is used in prior research as a 
proxy for growth opportunity. For example, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find 
that corporate growth opportunity is negatively associated with the debt-to-equity 
ratio. This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction of the trade-off theory. In 
addition, Profitable firms are likely to have more retained earnings. Therefore, based 
on the pecking order theory, profitable firms would prefer internal financing sources 
over the external sources. So a negative association between profitability and the 
debt-to-equity ratio is found in prior research (i.e. Kayhan and Titman, 2007). 
Furthermore, it is argued that large firms are more mature firms; and less likely to 
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bankrupt because of lower default risk than smaller firms (Elsas and Florysiak, 2008). 
Additionally, because of economies of scale, these firms face relatively lower cost per 
monetary unit raised externally. As a result, prior research finds that large firms are 
more likely to finance their activities using debt than smaller firms (Al-Najjar and 
Hussainey, 2009a and 2009b). Finally, prior research found a negative relationship 
between dividend policy and capital structure.  In particular, Jensen et al., (1992) and 
Aivazian et al., (2003) among those who argued that a firm’s debt-to-equity ratio is a 
key factor explaining the firm’s decisions to pay dividend. This result is supported by 
the agency costs theory of dividend policy. On the other hand, Chang and Rhee 
(1990) offered evidence showing a positive relationship between debt-to-equity ratio 
and corporate dividend policy, suggesting that “Firms with high payout ratios tend to 
be debt financed, while firms with low payout ratios tend to be equity financed” (p. 
23). This result is supported by the signalling theory. Our control variables are 
defined in Table 1.  
Sample Selection and Data Collection 
All sample firms are listed in either the Dubai Financial Market or Abu Dhabi 
Securities Market; the choice of firms was based on the availability of data. The year 
2006 was selected as it was the most recent data available at the time of the study. A 
time series analysis is not conducted in this study because of the high cost and the 
substantial effort needed to collect the data manually, especially the data related to 
corporate governance variables. Another important reason for not conducting a time 
series analysis is that the nature of the corporate governance mechanisms used in this 
study does not change over a short time of period, which alleviates the time-specific 
effects in this study. A total of 117 listed firms were incorporated at the time of the 
study. The banking and insurance sectors (46 firms) were excluded from the sample 
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as they are more regulated and have different capital structure mechanisms. 
Consequently, only 71 corporate annual reports were collected representing 
approximately 61% of the total population and 100% of the total of the non-financial 
firms (see Table 2). The sample includes firms which are dissimilar in size, and 
sector. 
4. Empirical Results 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 3 reports the minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation for the 
continuous variables in the sample data of this study. A broad range of variation is 
evident in the sample. The table provides some information about debt equity, which 
ranges from 0.00 to 6.83 and has a mean of 0.36 and a standard deviation of 0.97. 
This indicates that UAE firms, on average, do not have high gearing. Firm size 
(logarithm of revenues) ranges from 7 to 21 with a mean of 13.19 and a standard 
deviation of 2.09. Profitability ranges from 0.01 to 0.93 with a mean of 0.32 and a 
standard deviation of 0.24. This means that UAE firms, on average, have high 
profitability. The institutional investor ratio ranges from 0.00 to 0.99 with a mean of 
0.30 and a standard deviation of 0.23. Taking the average, it seems that UAE firms 
having reasonable percentage of institutional investors. In relation to board size, the 
results reveal a range from 3 to 15 with a mean of 7 and a standard deviation of 2.18. 
The governmental investor ratio ranges from 0.00 to 0.80 with a mean of .11 and a 
standard deviation of 0.19. This indicates that governmental investors participate less 
in the ownership of UAE firms than institutional investors. The dividends payout ratio 
ranges from 0.00 to 0.96 with a mean of 0.26 and a standard deviation of 0.27.  This 
result is to be expected, as a new and growing market may use a high dividend payout 
ratio to help attracting more investors and increase firm value. The Tobin Q ranges 
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from 0.02 to 3.16 with a mean of 1.33 and a standard deviation of 0.61.  The table 
also provides some information about the characteristics of the sample. It reveals that 
there is no statistically significant difference between the performance of firms 
engaging with the Big 4 accountancy firms and firms engaging with other auditing 
firms. 
Regression Analysis 
Table 4 shows that the coefficient of determination (R
2
) is equal to 32 percent 
and the adjusted R
2
 is equal to 18 percent which means that a considerable proportion 
of the variance is accounted for. The table also shows that the model reaches 
statistical significance as the p-value is less than 0.05. 
Tolerance values are calculated using (1-R
2
) for each variable and are 
presented in Table 4. Since all values are more than 0.10, there is no issue of multi-
colinearity between the independent variables (Menard, 1995). Also, all of the 
variance inflation factors (VIF) for the independent variables are less than 10, 
suggesting that there is no multi-colinearity between these variables (Myers, 1990).  
Table 5 presents the beta coefficients for the independent variables. The t 
statistics with the largest absolute values are 3.366 (p-value < 0.01), -2.884 (p-value < 
0.01), and -2.259 (p-value < 0.05), which relate to firm size, dividends payout ratio, 
and institutional investors ratio respectively.  This indicates that the three variables 
have a comparable degree of importance in the model.  In other words, they make the 
strongest unique contribution to explaining capital structure determination.   
The variable of institutional investors has a negative effect on capital structure. 
In other words, this result shows that firms that have a large proportion of institutional 
investors have less debt to finance. This result does not support the “active monitoring 
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hypothesis” of Demsetz (1983) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) where institutional 
investors are expected to exercise their voting rights effectively in order to prevent 
managers form reducing their “employment risk” at the expense of the interests of 
shareholders. On the other hand, the result is consistent with the results of Pound 
(1988) who suggests that there is a strategic alignment of mangers and institutional 
investors.  
The model shows that the dividends payout ratio has a significant negative 
impact on capital structure.  This result supports the theoretical expectation regarding 
the disciplining role of dividend payouts. However, it contradicts the findings of 
Bohren and Odegaard (2003), who found no disciplining role of dividend payouts. 
This result can be interpreted in another way, and it can be argued that a firm with a 
high payout ratio is more likely to use up its opportunity to reinvest for future growth. 
In other words, the higher the dividends payout ratio, the less the retained earnings, 
and hence the more debt a firm may need. Then the question is why the relationship 
between the payout of dividends and capital structure is negative. One possible 
interpretation for this result is that paying out more dividends exposes firms to more 
monitoring.  Moreover, higher payout can limit management discretion over free cash 
flow.  Therefore, a negative impact is expected for the dividends payout ratio on debt-
to-equity ratio.  
 Firm size is found to have a positive significant impact on capital structure. 
This is in agreement with the findings of Klapper and Love (2003), Bohren and 
Odegaard (2003), and Larker et al. (2004).  This result may reflect an independent 
source of value creation, possibly due to market power and economies of scale and 
scope (Bohren & Odegaard, 2003). In addition, large firms in the UAE have more 
resources (e.g., more skilled managers) compared to medium and small firms, and this 
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may help them to be more efficient and attractive to lenders. This indicates that large 
firms in the UAE tend to be more diverse in their debt management, and less likely to 
go bankrupt. Moreover, these firms are more likely to have a relatively lower cost for 
debt raised externally because of economies of scale (i.e. raising larger amounts of 
external finance).   
At the same time, the corporate governance variables, government ownership, 
audit type, and board size, were found not to have a significant impact on capital 
structure.  This result may be interpreted as indicating that the effective application of 
the appropriate principles and standards of corporate governance is absent in listed 
firms in the UAE. However, the government ownership has a negative impact on 
capital structure, although this result in not statistically significant. This result 
supports the ‘active monitoring hypothesis’ of Demsetz (1983) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) among others, and contradicts the results of Larcker et al. (2004) and 
Jong et al. (2005). The audit type variable has no significant effect on capital structure 
and that is probably because of the high quality of all the audit firms, including the 
small ones. Aljifri (2008) examines the level of financial disclosure by UAE listed 
firms in 2003 and finds that there is no significant difference in the disclosure levels 
between firms engaging with the big four audit firms and firms engaging with other 
audit firms. In other words, the audit type (by large or small firms) does not affect 
capital structure in UAE firms. The results also reveal that board size has a negative 
impact, although not significant, on capital structure. This suggests that UAE firms, 
on average, may select board members who are more conservative in relation to 





This study concludes that three variables appear to be strong predictors of the 
capital structure adopted by firms in the UAE.  However, another five variables 
(including control variables) are found to have a weak effect on the capital structure 
which could be a result of the absence of some important aspects of corporate 
governance practices and a lack of enforcement of rules.   
The central conclusions from our empirical analysis suggest that the financing 
decisions of UAE firms are driven by three variables (i.e., institutional investors, firm 
size, and dividend payout). The proportion of ordinary shares held by the institutional 
investors is the only corporate governance variable found to have a statistically 
significant relation with debt-to-equity ratio. This relation is found to be negative 
which implies that firms who have a large proportion of institutional investors are less 
likely to meet their financing needs by using debt. This behaviour is compatible with 
the pecking order theory, according to which firms would prefer to use internal 
sources of financing, such as cash from operating activities. The other corporate 
governance variables (board size, audit type, and governmental investors) and other 
capital structure theories (i.e., trade off theory; bankruptcy theory; agency theory; and 
transaction theory) are found not to have a significant effect on capital structure 
decisions made by UAE firms. The fact that these variables, many of which have been 
found to be significant in other markets, are not significant in the UAE may be 
because different legal, institutional, and cultural factors operate in the UAE. Those 
factors may shape the way in which corporate governing mechanisms influence 
capital structure decisions. For example, there is no income tax in the UAE, and this 
will mean that mechanisms that are used to trade off taxes against profits will not be 
relevant in the UAE. In addition, the corporate governance system in the UAE is 
 22 
based on the presence of large shareholders, as it is in many other developing 
countries. Market that is dominated by large shareholders may have less severe 
agency problems than would otherwise be the case, and agency theory may be of less 
use in examining capital structure decisions. 
Our paper shows that there is negative association, though not statistically 
significant, between UAE firms’ profitability and their debt-to-equity ratio. This 
finding is consistent with the pecking order theory which suggests that firms would 
follow a financing pattern that ranked different sources of finance in a particular 
order. They would prefer internal financing sources (e.g. retained earnings) over the 
external sources. Profitable firms are likely to have more retained earnings. Hence 
there firms are less likely to finance their activities by debt. 
Finally, we find that there is a negative association, though not statistically 
significant, between board size and debt-to-equity ratio for UAE firms. This result 
suggests that boards with a large number of directors are more likely to have difficulty 
in reaching agreement because of different and conflicting opinions and views. 
Consequently, UAE firms with large boards prefer equity financing rather than debt 
financing to reduce the cost associated with communication and coordination 
problems between directors. Additionally, the result suggests that UAE directors 
might prefer equity financing because their firms have, on average, healthy 
profitability.    
It is hoped that this study will improve the understanding of corporate 
governance mechanisms and their impact on the capital structure decisions.  The 
study extends the literature on the effect of firm-specific variables on capital structure 
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decisions in the UAE. This may help users of financial information to assess the 
impact of such variables in improving capital structure decisions.       
This study indicates that there may be a need to encourage policy makers in 
the UAE to ensure that firms implement effective internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms. This implementation should be appropriate for the UAE 
business environment while embracing international corporate governance standards. 
It is expected that the effective implementation of the codes of corporate governance 
will contribute to improve efficiency, effectiveness and governance in the UAE stock 
markets. Therefore, a real commitment is needed from all listed firms in the market, 
and this can only be achieved by improving the regulatory and enforcement 
frameworks.  
Future research should be conducted taking into account some important 
corporate governance variables such as the level of ownership concentration, the 
percentage of outside board members, the existence of an audit committee, insider 
ownership, voting coalitions, product-market competition, and other hidden cultural 
factors. Additional research might also be directed towards the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the capital structure decisions of UAE firms using larger 
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Table 1 Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Leverage ( itLev ) Debt to equity ratio 
Board size The number of executive and 
non executive directors on the board. 
Institutional investors The proportion of the ordinary shares held by the 
institutional investors. 
Governmental ownership The proportion of ordinary shares owned by the 
government. 
Audit type A dummy variable and takes the value of one if the 
audit firm is one of the Big 4 and zero otherwise 
Tobin's Q The market value of equity plus the book value of 
the debt divided by the book value of the total 
assets. 
Profitability Net income divided by sales 
Firm size The natural logarithm of sales 
Dividend policy Dividend Payout ratio 
 
  
Table 2 Sample Selection 
Sectors No. of Firms 
All sectors* 117 
Banking and insurance sectors 46 
The study sample 71 
The Abu Dhabi Securities Market and Dubai Financial Market use different sector 























Table 3   Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Debt Equity 71 .00 6.83 .36 0.97 
Board size 71 3.00 15.00 7.00 2.18 
Institutional Investors 71 0.00 0.99 0.30 .023 
Governmental 
ownership 
71 0.00 0.80 0.11 0.19 
Audit Type- Big 4** 41 0.00 6.83 0.42 1.13 
Audit Type- Non-Big 
4** 
30 0.00 3.98 301 0.73 
TobinQ (Growth) 71 .02 3.16 1.33 .61 
Profitability 71 0.01 0.93 0.32 0.24 
Firm size* 71 7 21 13.19 2.09 
Dividends Payout 71 0.00 0.96 0.26 0.27 
* Firm’s size is measured by the natural logarithm of sales in the regression model 
used in this study.  
**No significant difference was found, using a Mann-Whitney test, between the 
mean of the Tobin Q in firms engaging with Big 4 and firms engaging with 





























Table 4:  Model Summary 
 
 
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
F p-value Durbin-Watson 












Coefficients Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
  B t P-value Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  -.968 -1.254 .217   
Board Size - -.054 -1.480 .147 .884 1.131 
Institutional Investors + -.008 -2.259 .029 .754 1.327 
Governmental ownership + -.002 -.420 .677 .898 1.114 
Audit Type + -.065 -.446 .658 .894 1.119 
ToninQ (Growth) + .007 .059 .953 .940 1.064 
Profitability - -.268 -1.376 .176 .803 1.245 
Firm Size + .160 3.366 .002 .642 1.557 
Dividend Payout - -.002 -2.884 .006 .633 1.579 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
